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Abstract
What are the criteria that a measure of statistical evidence should satisfy? It is argued that a measure of evidence
should be consistent. Consistency is an asymptotic criterion: the probability that if a measure of evidence in data
strongly testifies against a hypothesis H, then H is indeed not true, should go to one, as more and more data appear.
The p-value is not consistent, while the ratio of likelihoods is.
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1. Introduction
The p-value is commonly used as a measure of evidence in a data Xn1 , against a hypothesis H1: the smaller the
p-value, the stronger the evidence against H1 in the data. Recall that the p-value is the smallest level at which a test
T (Xn1) rejects H1. According to the typical calibration [4], [18], the p-value smaller than 0.01 suggests a very strong
evidence against H1.
Unlike the p-value, which measures evidence against a single hypothesis, the ratio of likelihoodsa measures evi-
dence in a data for a simple hypothesis H1, relative to a simple hypothesis H2. For a parametric model fX (x | θ), the
ratio of likelihoods r12 = f (Xn1 |H1)/ f (Xn1 |H2) measures evidence for H1 relative to H2, in data Xn1 . The value of r12
above a certain threshold k > 1 is taken as an evidence in favor of H1, and against H2. Values of k around 30 are
suggested for a threshold, above which the evidence is considered very strong (cf. [14], [1]).
Statistics abounds criteria for assessing quality of estimators, tests, forecasting rules, classification algorithms,
but besides the likelihood principle discussions (cf. [2]), it seems to be almost silent on what criteria should a good
measure of evidence satisfy. Schervish, in a notable exceptionb [16], considers a requirement of coherence, borrowed
from the multiple comparisons theory [7]. If H : θ ∈ Θ implies H′ : θ ∈ Θ′ (i.e., Θ ⊂ Θ′), then the coherent measure
of evidence gives at least as strong evidence to H′ as it gives to H. The p-value is not coherent; cf. [16]. In this note,
an asymptotic criterion of consistency is introduced, and it is demonstrated that the p-value is not consistent, while
the ratio of likelihoods satisfies the consistency requirement.
2. Measure of evidence
To set a formal framework, let X ∈ RK be a random variable with the probability density (or mass) function
fX(x | θ), parametrized by θ ∈ Θ ⊆ RL, and such that if θ , θ′ then fX(· | θ) , fX (· | θ′). Let Θ1,Θ2 form a partition
of Θ, and associate Θ j with the hypothesis H j, j = 1, 2. Let Xn1 , X1, . . . , Xn ∼ fX (x | θ) be a random sample fromfX(x | θ). A measure of evidence ǫ(H1, H2, Xn1), in data Xn1 , for the hypothesis H1 : Xn1 ∼ fX(x | θ) where θ ∈ Θ1,
relative to H2 : Xn1 ∼ fX(x | θ) where θ ∈ Θ2, is a mapping ǫ(H1, H2, Xn1) : Θ1 × Θ2 × (RK)n → R. It usually goes with
a calibration that partitions values of ǫ(·) into intervals, or categories. In what follows, the interest will concentrate
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on the category S of the most extreme values of the evidence measure ǫ(·) that correspond to the strongest evidence.
Finally, the measure of evidence against a hypothesis H1, relative to H2, in data Xn1 , will be denoted ǫ(¬H1, H2, Xn1).
3. Consistency requirement
In [17], Sellke, Bayarri, and Berger stress that in applications of an evidence measure, data sets may come from
either H1 or H2. The authors illustrate this important point by an example of testing drugs D1, D2, D3, . . . , for an
illness, in a series of independent experiments. The measure of evidence applied to a data set from i-th experiment, is
used to differentiate between the hypothesis H1 that the drug Di has a negligible effect, and the alternative H2 that the
drug Di has a non-negligible effect. Some drugs have negligible effects, some have the non-negligible one. In other
words, some experimental data Xn1 come from H1, other data sets are from H2. This key aspect of applications of the
evidence measure can be captured by the following two-level sampling mechanism:
1. First, θ is drawn from a pdf (or pmf) p(θ).
2. Given θ, a random sample Xn1 is drawn from fX(x | θ).
As the sample size n increases, it should hold, informally put, that among the data sets which, according to the
measure of evidence strongly testify against H1, the relative number of those which in fact come from H1, should go
to zero. This motivates the following requirement of consistencyc: We say that a measure of evidence ǫ(¬H1, H2, Xn1)
against H1, relative to H2, is consistent, if
lim
n→∞
Pr(H1 | ǫ(¬H1, H2, Xn1) ∈ S ) = 0.
The probability that θ is in Θ1, given that the measure of evidence ǫ(¬H1, H2, Xn1) strongly testifies against H1,
relative to H2, should go to zero, as the sample size n goes beyond any limit.
4. Is the p-value consistent?
The p-value is π , inf {α : T (Xn1) ∈ Rα}, where T is a test statistic, α is the size of the test, and Rα is the rejection
region for H1. In this section it is assumed that X is a continuous random variable and the test statistic T is such
that it rejects H1 when the observed value t of T is large. Then the p-value is π = supΘ1 Pr(T > t | θ). The p-value
π(¬H1, ·, Xn1) as a measure of evidence against H1 does not take H2 into account. Let S = [0, αS ) be the interval of
values that indicate the very strong evidence against H1.
Before addressing the question of consistency of the p-value in general, consider an illustrative example of the
gaussian random variable X with the variance σ2 = 1, and let Θ1 = {θ1}, Θ2 = {θ1 + δ}, δ > 0. Let w = p(Θ1),
w ∈ (0, 1). And, let T (Xn1) =
√
n(x − θ1) be the test statistic, and Rα = {Xn1 : T (Xn1) > z1−α} be the rejection region,
with z1−α denoting the 1 − α quantile of the standard normal distribution.
Under H1, the p-value is a uniform random variable, so Pr(π(¬H1, ·, Xn1) ∈ S |Θ1) = αs. Under H2, the power
of the test is Pr(π(¬H1, ·, Xn1) ∈ S |Θ2) = 1 − Φ(z1−αs −
√
nδ), where Φ(·) is the distribution function of the stan-
dard normal random variable. Note that Pr(π(¬H1, ·, Xn1) ∈ S |Θ2) converges to 1, for δ > 0. Taken together,
limn→∞ Pr(H1 | ǫ(¬H1, ·, Xn1) ∈ S ) = αS w1−w(1−αS ) . Thus, in this simple example, the p-value is not a consistent measure
of evidence against H1.
Following the reasoning in the above example, it can be demonstrated that the p-value is inconsistentd.
Proposition 1. Let Θ1, Θ2 form a partition of Θ. Let p(θ) be such that w ,
∫
Θ1
p(θ) is w ∈ (0, 1). And, let T , Rα, be
such that Pr(π(¬H1, ·, Xn1) ∈ S |Θ2) → 1, as n → ∞ (i.e., for θ ∈ Θ2, the power of the test T converges to 1). Then it
holds that
lim
n→∞
Pr(H1 | π(¬H1, ·, Xn1) ∈ S ) =
αS w
1 − w(1 − αS ) . (1)
Proof. Under H1, the p-value is uniformly distributed, so that Pr(π(¬H1, ·, Xn1) ∈ S ) | θ) = αS , for θ ∈ Θ1. Thus,∫
Θ1
Pr(π(¬H1, ·, Xn1) ∈ S | θ)p(θ) = αS w. Next, under the assumption that the power of the test T goes to 1, as n → ∞,
the probability
∫
Θ2
Pr(π(¬H1, ·, Xn1) ∈ S | θ)p(θ) → 1 − w. Taken together, it proves the Proposition.
2
Since the right-hand side expression in (1) is positive, the p-value is not a consistent measure of evidence. The
limit of the probability becomes zero only at the extreme, uninteresting case of w = 0, i.e., when no Xn1 comes from
H1. For the typical value of αS = 0.01 and w = 1/2, the limit value of the probability is αS /(1 + αS ) = 0.0099. For
w = 0.9, the probability is 0.0826. For w = 0.999, the probability is 0.9090, and it converges to 1, as w → 1. The
greater the relative presence of data sets from H1, the higher the asymptotic probability that the data come from H1,
when the p-value strongly testifies against H1.
5. Is the ratio of likelihoods consistent?
For point sets Θ1, Θ2, the ratio of likelihoods r12 of H1 relative to H2 is r12 , f1/ f2, where f j , fXn1 (xn1 |Θ j),
for j = 1, 2. The ratio r12 measures the evidence in favor of H1 (and against H2), in data Xn1 . The larger the r12, the
stronger the evidence in favor of H1 (and against H2), so that S = [kS ,∞), kS > 1.
First, consider the ratio of likelihoods r21 in the example described above. Clearly, Pr(r21(¬H1, H2, Xn1) ∈ S |Θ1) =
1−Φ(log kS /δ
√
n+
√
nδ/2), which, under the assumption δ > 0, converges to 0, as n → ∞. And, Pr(r21(¬H1, H2, Xn1) ∈
S |Θ2) = 1 − Φ(log kS /δ
√
n − √nδ/2), which, under the assumption δ > 0, converges to 1, as n → ∞. Thus,
limn→∞ Pr(H1 | r21(¬H1, H2, Xn1) ∈ S ) = 0. Hence, the ratio of likelihoods is a consistent measure of evidence, in this
example.
And the consistency is not accidental, as stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. For point sets Θ1, Θ2, and p(Θ1) ∈ (0, 1), the ratio of likelihoods r21(¬H1, H2, Xn1) is a consistent
measure of evidence, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
Pr(H1 | r21(¬H1, H2, Xn1) ∈ S ) = 0.
Proof. The claim follows from the Law of Large Numbers (LLN), applied to 1/n log f2/ f1 |Θ j, and the fact that the
Kullback Leibler divergence is positive for distinct distributions.
Recently, Bickel [3] proposed an extension of the ratio of likelihoods (see also [10], [19]) to the case of general
Θ1, Θ2: r
e
12 , supΘ1 f (Xn1 | θ)/supΘ2 f (Xn1 | θ), and suggested its use as a measure of evidence. The extended ratio of
likelihoods reduces to the ratio of likelihoods, when Θ1, Θ2 are point sets. Under additional assumptions, re21 is a
consistent measure of evidence. Before stating the result, recall that the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator ˆθ( ˜Θ) of
θ, restricted to ˜Θ ⊂ Θ, is ˆθ( ˜Θ) , arg supθ∈ ˜Θ fXn1 (xn1 | θ).
Proposition 3. Let fX(x | θ) and Θ1, Θ2 be such that the maximum likelihood estimators ˆθ j(Θ j), restricted to Θ j, are
consistent estimators of θ, j = 1, 2. And let the maximum likelihood estimators ˆθ j(Θi), restricted to Θi, converge in
probability to some finite ¯θ j, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i , j. Let p(θ) be such that
∫
Θ1
p(θ) ∈ (0, 1). Then the extended ratio of
likelihoods re21(¬H1, H2, Xn1) is a consistent measure of evidence against H1, relative to H2.
Proof. Under the assumed consistency and convergence of the constrained MLs, the claim follows from the LLN
and the positivity of the Kullback Leibler divergence between two different distributions, applied to the probability
Pr(re21 > kS | θ) in the upper bound
[
supΘ1 Pr(re21>kS | θ)
] ∫
Θ1
p(θ)
∫
Θ2
Pr(re21>kS | θ)p(θ)
and the lower bound
[
infΘ1 Pr(re21 > kS | θ)
] ∫
Θ1
p(θ) of
Pr(θ ∈ Θ1 | re21(¬H1, H2, Xn1) ∈ S ).
6. Is the Bayes factor consistent?
It is open to debate whether a measure of evidence can depend on a prior information. Bayesians usually measure
evidence for H1 relative to H2 by the Bayes Factor b12 ,
∫
H1
f (Xn1 | θ)q(θ) dθ/
∫
H2
f (Xn1 | θ)q(θ) dθ, where q(·) is the
prior distribution. The Bayes Factor above 150 is usually considered [9] as the very strong evidence for H1. However,
Lavine and Schervish [10] note that the Bayes factor does not satisfy the coherence requirement, while the posterior
odds is coherent. Both the Bayes factor b21 and the posterior odds p21(H2, H1, Xn1) , b21 q(Θ2)/q(Θ1) are consistent
measures of evidence against H1, relative to H2. Also, in analogy with the Proposition 3, consistency of the ratio of
posterior modes can be established.
3
7. Conclusions
There are several measures of statistical evidence in use. Among them is the Fisherian p-value and its extensions,
likelihood-based measures, such as the ratio of likelihoods and the extended ratio of likelihoods, as well as the Bayes
factor and the posterior odds. What are the criteria that a measure of evidence should satisfy? Coherence (cf. Sect. 1)
is one such a criterion. It is a logical criterion. In this note, the asymptotic criterion of consistency was introduced.
Besides being incoherent, the p-value is also inconsistent. The ratio of likelihoods and its extension are consistent and
coherent measures. Among the Bayesian measures of evidence, for instance the posterior odds ratio is both coherent
and consistent.
Notes
aLikelihood ratio is used in the Neyman Pearson hypothesis testing. To distinguish the evidential use of the likelihood ratio from its use in
decision making, the former is referred to as the Ratio of Likelihoods (RL). RL has a rich history, cf. [6], [1], [8], [5], [11], [12], [14], [15], among
others.
bSee also Sect. 3.2 in Edward’s monograph [5], and a recent work [3] of Bickel.
cIn [17], Sellke, Bayarri, and Berger use a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the probability Pr(Θ1 | π(¬H1; ·, Xn1) ≈ 0.05), for a point set Θ1,
in small samples, for the p-value, and relate it to the analogous probability for the Bayes Factor, which is in the studied setting the same as the ratio
of likelihoods. The authors do not propose an asymptotic criterion for a measure of evidence.
dThe Proposition 1 holds also for the p-value that is valid in the sense of Mudholkar and Chaubey [13].
to mar, in memoriam
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